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NOTES
The Multinational Corporation as a Challenge to the NationState: A Need to Coordinate National Competition Policies
The recent growth and development of the multinational
corporation presents the international community with a unique
challenge. For the first time man has an instrument which enables him
to use the world's resources with maximum efficiency. He is no longer
restricted by national boundaries, but is able to allocate resources on
a world wide basis. In addition, .the multinational enterprise provides
a means for linking the developing countries to an international
productive scheme. These countries are now able to undertake
production of goods in which they have a comparative advantage and
more rapidly increase their rate of economic development.
Since the multinational enterprise trains the manpower of nations,
develops their resources, and permits a cross fertilization of ideas and
cultures, it may also be an important element in reconciling the diverse
peoples of the world. Indeed, some observers believe that the
multinational corporation will be more than merely an instrument for
production; it will be "a stabilizer in a world full of tensions,"' and
provide "a means of unifying and reconciling the aspirations of
mankind ..

"2

The internationalization of the activities of the modern
corporation is, however, challenging the legal and political monopoly
of the nation state. Since the subsidiary of a multinational concern can
never, no matter how much autonomy is granted it, be the equivalent
of an independent enterprise, national policies based entirely on
domestic conditions may no longer be valid where an affiliate of one
or more multinational firms is located within a country. The
tremendous financial and technological resources and the wide
geographical diversification of the multinational corporation enable it
to challenge the sovereignty of the nation-state. Since it is often
intimately involved in the economic growth And development of the
countries in which it operates, it can directly affect the nature and
extent of local governmental control.
Finally, since it operates simultaneously in many different
1. Special Report, Multinational Companies, BUSINESS WEEK, April 20, 1963, at 68
[hereinafter cited as Special Report]. See also The Promise of the Multinational Corporation,
FORTUNE,

2.

June 1, 1967, at 80.

Brown, Note Front the Editor,4 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 5 (Mar.-Apr. 1969).
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countries, the enterprise may also be the source of international tension
and conflict as nations exert their control over the multinational
corporation to influence its activities in foreign countries.
National laws touch the multinational corporation in virtually
every important aspect of its behavior. In every country where it
operates, the multinational company is affected by national restrictions
on trade. Every state has its own complex tax structure, local company
laws, commercial and penal codes, and laws relating to employment,
property rights, patents, trademarks, and copyrights. This note will,
however, be limited to an examination of the effect of the multinational
corporation on national competition policies. It will focus on the
impact of internationalization of production on the ability of the nation
state to regulate competition.
Although until now, each nation has been able to develop its own
competition policy' in light of its own goals and objectives and on the
premise that its horizons were limited by its own national boundaries,
it is becoming increasingly evident that the nation-state may no longer
be the optimum political organization for the regulation of
competition. Since the nation state is strong and is not apt to wither
away in the near future, however, a means must be found to resolve
the conflict which has arisen between the multinational corporation and
national sovereignty.
-Although a number of solutions have been recommended, the wide
variety of national approaches to restraints on competition and the
resulting diversity of governmental attitudes with respect to the same
restrictive business practices suggests that the most realistic approach
under existing circumstances would be the creation of an international
organization to coordinate existing national competition policies. Since
a detailed description of such an organizational mechanism is beyond
the scope of this note, an attempt will be made to present general
guidelines for the adoption of such an approach (Part V). The note will
first examine the multinational corporation (Part I) and the challenge
it presents to the nation-state (Part II). It will then outline the main
problem which must be faced in developing a system of international
control-the wide variation in national competition policies (Part III).
Finally, it will look briefly at previous attempts to regulate restrictive
business practices on an international basis (Part IV).
3. Although not all countries have enacted specific statutory measures concerning the
regulation of competition, the term "competition policy" will be used throughout this note
because all nations have a policy with regard to the regulition of restraints on competition.
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I.

THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION

International trade has existed since the beginning of time, and the
ownership of foreign operations by businessmen is not a new
phenomenon.' Until very recently, however, few of these foreign
ventures were "integral units of a larger, parent entity in the sense that
they were responsive to a broad strategy developed by the parent."5
Prior to World War II a number of these so called "multinational
corporations" did maintain manufacturing facilities abroad as part of
a wide, integrated commercial strategy, but the movement toward
internationalization succumbed to cartels, price-setting agreements, and
divided markets among the producing giants.' The movement, however,
reappeared in the post-war period, and in the last decade the trend
toward internationalization has become a major industrial
development.
A.

The Movement Toward Internationalization

The universality of the move to
gauged by the tremendous increase
investment.7 By 1957 United States
25.1 billion dollars' and by 1966 the
54.6 billion dollars.9 As a percent

international production can be
in the amount of direct foreign
investment abroad had reached
total had more than doubled to
of total assets, foreign direct

4. Professor Sidney E. Rolfe concludes in his report on the international corporation that
the internationalization of production is not new. "The international corporation started its

outward march at about the turn of the century." S.ROLFE,

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
I I (XXl Ind Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce 1969) [hereinafter cited as THE

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION]. It should be noted that the term "international corporation,"
as used throughout Professor Rolfe's report, corresponds to the term "multinational
corporation," which will appear throughout this note.
5. Vernon, Antitrust and International Business, 46 HARV. Bus. REv. 78, 79 (Sept.-Oct.
1968). Most of these earlier foreign interests were "either inconsequential branches of the parent
enterprise or units akin to portfolio investments operated at the discretion of local expatriate
managers." Id.
6. For example, during the period from 1929 to 1946 direct United States foreign
investment actually decreased from $7.5 to $7.2 billion. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
supra note 4, at 22, 147 table 3.
7. It is important to note that one of the major difficulties associated with the analysis of
the multinational corporation is the fact that the statistics, except those emanating from the
United States, are less than adequate. Existing statistics are, however, sufficient for the purpose
of this paper as they clearly indicate the significant trend toward the internationalization of
production. The most complete collection of data to date is set forth in Professor Rolfe's report.
Id. at 20-28.
8. United States direct investment amounted to only $7.2 billion in 1946. Id. at 147 table
3.
9. Id.
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investment for all United States manufacturing industries increased
from 2.7 percent in 1950 to 5.0 percent in 1964.10

Despite the lack of foreign data, international investment is not a
phenomenon unique to America. Similar movements toward

international production are underway in other countries. For example,
direct investment from France increased some 300 percent from 1962

to 1966,11 while Germany also increased its overseas assets threefold
during this period." In addition, Swedish capital abroad doubled
between 1960 and 1965 from Kr. 2.5 to Kr. 4.5 billion. 3 Total direct
foreign investment as of 1966 was estimated to be about 90 billion
dollars.

4

While an overwhelming share of this is American,,' European

and Japanese foreign investment accounted for approximately 31
6
billion dollars.
The movement toward internationalization can also be gauged by
the number of foreign production facilities and the percentage of

"foreign content" in a corporation's make-up. For example, 62 of the
largest 100 American firms have production facilities in six or more
foreign countries, while 39 of the largest 100 non-American firms do

also. If the cut-off point is reduced from six to four countries, then 64
of the largest7 non-American firms may be considered
"multinational."
An alternative means for determining the importance of
international investment is the percentage of foreign content in a
10. Vernon, supra note 5, at 82 exhibit II.
I1. French direct investment abroad increased from .52 billion Fr. in 1962 to over 1.3
billion Fr. in 1966. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 26, 167 table 16.
12. In Germany the net amounts invested abroad rose from 3.8 billion DM in 1961 to over
12 billion DM in 1967. Id. at 26-27, 173 table 18a.
13. Id. at 27, 173 table 19.
14. Id. at 20, 145 table 1.
15. United States direct foreign investment as of 1966 amounted to approximately $55
billion. Id. at 146 table 2.
16. Rose, The Rewarding Strategies of Multinationalism,FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1968, at 100.
See also THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 146 table 2. Prior to the imposition
of the mandatory controls on capital outflows, the National Industrial Conference Board
predicted that "by 1975 about 25% of the approximately $1-trillion G.N.P. of the rest of the free
world would come from the branches and subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, and some 35% would
be 'U.S.-tinged'-that is, would be associated with either direct or portfolio investment by
Americans. Moreover, the N.I.C.B. estimated that nearly 20% of the projected G.N.P. of the U.S.
in 1975-also about $1 trillion-would be 'European-or Japanese-tinged.' In contrast, U.S.
exports to the rest of the free world were expected to amount to only about $42 billion by 1975,
and world sales to the U.S. about $29 billion." Rose, supra at 100.
17. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 23. For a listing of United
Kingdom companies with six or more production facilities abroad, see id. at 155 table 10,
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company's make-up.1s The term "foreign content" is defined to include
"the percentage of a company's total assets abroad, the percentage of
its sales, of its income or of its labor force."19
Most of the early United States foreign investment was
concentrated in Canada and Latin America and the bulk of it was in
only a few extractive industries.2 For example, nearly two-thirds of
United States foreign investment in 1957 was concentrated in these
areas, and the largest single investment was in petroleum.2 ' By 1966,

however, American investment in Canada doubled and in Europe
quadrupled, while United States investment in Latin America rose only

period, manufacturing had
about fifteen percent. During this same
22

replaced petroleum as the prime industry.
Although the bulk of United States capital has been directly

invested in other industrialized nations, an increasing amount has been
directed at the underdeveloped areas as well. Lately these figures have

begun to show some significant increases, and as of 1960, Americans
had invested over thirteen billion dollars in less-developed countries

outside of Canada and Western Europe?. Although most of this large
stake is in just a few countries24 and the bulk of it is in only a few
2
extractive industries, 25 the shift to manufacturing investment is visible. 1
Many factors have led to the development of the multinational
corporation.2 Although in most instances positive considerations, such
18. For a listing of United States multinational companies in which the foreign content is
more than 25%, see BRUCK & LEES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, CAPITAL CONTROLS, AND THE
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 83-85 (1968). For a listing of European international companies in which
the foreign content is more than 25%, see THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at
154 table 9.
19. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 23.
20. For an indication of the trend of United States direct investment between 1929 and
1966, see THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 147 table 3. See generally Vernon,
The American Corporationin UnderdevelopedAreas, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY
242 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
21. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 147 table 3.
22. Id. Similar data are not available for other countries.
23. Vernon, supra note 20, at 242.
24. "For example, of the $1,234 million which American direct investors sent to countries
outside of Canada and Western Europe in 1957, about 65% went to Venezuela and another 18%
to four other countries in Latin America; the rest of the underdeveloped world received only $222
million." Id. at 246-47.
25. In 1957, some 83% of United States foreign investment was directed to mining and
petroleum ventures, while only $205 million went to manufacturing and other activities. Id. at
247.
26. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 22.
27. For an extensive discussion of the factors influencing the trend toward
internationalization, see THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 61-66; Rose, supra
note 16, at 101-02; Special Report, supra note I, at 68, 70.
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as reduced costs and increased sales, have been the primary motivation
for the movement abroad, in some cases international investment has
resulted from defensive motives or external pressures. There is no doubt
that economic forces have influenced the growth of the multinational
corporation. As Professor Sidney E. Rolfe notes:
the basic motivation of the international corporation in expanding abroad is the
same as that for a national corporation's expansion, to wit, the quest for profits,
as profits may be earned within the constraints imposed by prevailing and
foreseeable competitive conditions.2

The classic motive, then, is to penetrate a market more effectively. The
growth of foreign markets, "the desire of companies to be near their
markets so that they can supply inventories quickly, or tailor products
to local needs, or otherwise participate with greater efficiency, and
without the added cost of freight, has been the predominant reason for
2' ' 9
the development of production facilities abroad.
In addition, since a multinational firm operates in many different
markets, it is able to take advantage of varying labor conditions,
market demands, money-market rates and tax laws. As a result, 'hen
it can closely coordinate all the parts of its operation, the multinational
corporttion is able to minimize costs and maximize profits on a worldwide basis." Carrying multinationalism to the logical extreme, then, a
corporation is able to concentrate its production in the area where costs
are lowest, and build up its sales where the market is most profitable.
A number of companies have embarked on foreign operations with
a clearly perceived strategy of linking their own competitive advantage,
which may be in technology, reputation, cheap capital, brand name, or
highly trained management, with the advantage peculiar to another
region, such as cheap labor.3 ' For example, a French aluminum
company came to the United States because it saw a profitable linkage
between its own technology and the relatively low-cost capital and low32
cost energy available in this country.
28.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note

29.

Id. at 63.

4, at 62.

30. For example, resourceful companies can "use their multiple bases to keep money costs
down by . . .taking advantage of low interest rates in one country to supply the working-capital
needs of operations in high-interest areas. The procedure is simple when money can be borrowed,
either in the international capital market or various local markets, and easily shifted from country
to country. But sometimes the movement of money is subject to local governmental restriction;
in such cases, a principal method is to delay or accelerate payment on the sale of raw materials,
components, and finished goods within the corporate family .
Rose, supra note 16, at 101.
See generally id. at 102-03.
31. THE INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 62; Rose, supra note 16, at 102.
32. Rose, supra note 16, at 102. Many foreign companies also locate in the United States
to take advantage of American technology.
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Although the advantages of international operations are clear in
retrospect, they were not nearly so apparent when corporations began
investing abroad. Defensive motives sometimes provided the impetus
for international investment. The existence of tariffs is the primary
defensive reason for the internationalization of production.3 3 In many
instances, as happened to the farm machinery manufacturers in
Mexico, 34 a foreign government will raise prohibitive barriers against
imports of a product, making local manufacture the only means of
serving the market. Other corporations have moved production
facilities abroad because of a fear that their competitors, who were
going overseas, would get a head start in a potentially rich market, 5
or would acquire a cheap source of supply for possible re-import into
the United States, thus threatening their domestic market position.
Still others moved in order to be near their customers.
Other major reasons for the internationalization of production
include the impact of United States antitrust laws, the reduction of
risks inherent in "foreign operations," and the external persuasion and
inducements offered by the host country. Under United States antitrust
laws, cartels are illegal, at least for American corporations, and the
prosecution of such arrangements has been vigorous.37 At the same
time that international agreements were being prohibited in the United
States, the risks that were once associated with foreign investment were
being greatly reduced.3 8 With the gradual elimination of restrictions on
capital movements in Europe and the rapid growth and greater stability
of the Continental economies, corporations became more willing to
make investment decisions on a pure cost-return basis.3 9 Finally,
international investment has occurred in response to persuasion and
pressures offered by the host country. 0 In many instances host
governments will offer either direct or indirect incentives, such as
promises of tax benefits or greater access to credit, in order to provide
33.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 63-64.

34.
35.

Rose, supra note 16, at 101.
This has been termed by Professor Rolfe as "follow the competitor's" strategy. THE

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 64.

36.

Id.; Rose, supra note 16, at 101-02.

37.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 10-11.

38. Rose, supra note 16, at 101.
39. This is evidenced by the fact that in a recent survey 39 of 92 United States companies
with substantial direct investments said that, "in making up their capital budgets, they made no
distinction between foreign and domestic investment alternatives." Id. at 101.
40. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 64-65; Vernon, supra note 5, at
84-85.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

local production as a substitute for imports or to further their
industrialization plans.
B. The MultinationalCorporationDefined
A multinational corporation" "is one in which, structurally and
policy-wise, foreign operations are co-equal with domestic"
operations.12 Despite the fact that ownership and management remain
uninational and, therefore, decisions remain nationally-biased,
"management is willing to allocate company resources without regard
to national frontiers to achieve corporate objectives." 3 Accordingly, in
order to be considered "multinational," a corporation must meet two
tests. 4 First, it must have a manufacturing base or some other form
of direct investment that gives it roots in at least one foreign country.
Second, it must have a genuinely global perspective. A corporation has
a global perspective if "its management makes fundamental decisions
on marketing, production, and research in terms of the alternatives that
are available to it anywhere in the world." 45 Thus, a multinational
firm's management sees its enterprise as a global entity; it sees its
foreign and domestic interests interwoven into a web of carefully
integrated parts. Consequently, it will allocate its capital, manpower,
and other resources on a global basis.
A transnational corporation "is a multinational firm managed
and owned by persons of different national origins." Carrying the
process one step further, a supranational corporation "is a
transnational firm legally denationalized by permitting it exclusively to
register with, be controlled by, and pay taxes to, some international
41. There is no wide-spread agreement on a precise definition of the term "multinational."
Obviously, there are degrees of multinationalism, and the terms international, multinational, and

transnational are used interchangeably, each connoting to the user a different concept of the
degree of internationalization of power. The following discussion of the multinational corporation

will rely heavily on Professor Richard Robinson's set of definitions as set forth in THiE
INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL,

CORPORATION,
THE

CONCEPT

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,

supra note 4, at 12. See also
OF THE

INTERNATIONAL

EDITORS

CORPORATION

OF

BuSINESS

(1964); THE

supra note 4, at 11-16; Perlmutter, The Tortuous Evolttion of

the MultinationalCorporation,4 COLtUM. J.

WORLD

Bus. 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1969).

An international corporation "is one in which international operations are consolidated in a
line office on the division level and, as a matter of policy, is willing to consider all potential

strategies for entering foreign markets-up to direct investment." THE INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,

supra note 4, at 12.

supra note 4, at 12.

42.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,

43.
44.

Id.
See Special Report, supra note 1, at 63.

45.

Id.

46.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4,

at 12.
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body established by multinational convention."4 7 Thus, a corporation
could be properly termed supranational only if a registration process

existed in some authority independent of nation-states, such as an office
of the United Nations. With such an independent authority, the

be free of the law and, necessarily, the
multinational enterprise would
8

influence of a nation-state.

By the above standards, most of the firms with foreign branches
today are multinational. They are identifiable, for example, as

American, German, or Swiss because ownership and management is
localized in the country of their origin." As firms increasingly recruit
both money5 and managers 51 in areas other than their country of

origin, they will become transnational, and national bias will gradually
play a lesser part in the decision making process.12 As for supranational
corporations, Professor Rolfe notes that "the legal basis for their
evolution is not yet at hand, and the corporate move would require still
more time." 3 The evolution to a supranational firm, however, seems

a bit less remote when the possibility of some true international
mergers are taken into account. 54 Should international mergers begin

of power in the
to come about, the prospects for the internationalization
55
corporations becomes vastly enhanced.
C.

Economic

Consequences

of

the

Movement

Toward

Internationalization

Although the economic benefits derived from direct investment
defy measurement, such investment clearly contributes to the growth
of underdeveloped areas. 6 The advantages normally attributed to the
47. Id.
48. A set of definitions based on the psychological attitude of managers has been suggested
by Professor Howard Perlmutter. He distinguishes "attitudes [which] may be described as
ethnocentric (or home-country oriented), polycentric (or host-country oriented) and geocentric
(or world-oriented). while they never appear in pure form, they are clearly distinguishable."
Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 11.
49. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 12.
50. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
51. See text accompanying notes 75-80 infra.
52. A few firms, such as I.B.M., Shell and Unilever, are beginning to become transnational.
Rolfe, Updating Adam Smith, INTERPLAY, Nov. 1968, at 19.
53. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 13.
54. For a discussion of the barriers to international mergers, see id. at 89-93.
55. At least one observer indicates that "[s]ome important European transnational mergers
appear on the verge of realization." Knoppers, Transferring Technology: A New Situation,
INTERPLAY,

Nov. 1968, at 27.

56. For an extensive discussion of the benefits derived from direct foreign investment in
underdeveloped areas, see Vernon, supra note 20, at 242; Vernon, Foreign-Owned Enterprise in
Montgomery & A. Smithies eds. 1966).
the Developing Countries, in XV PUBLIC POLICY 361 (J.
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installation of foreign firms are that they bring with them a stimulation
of competition, an influx of capital, a contribution of duties to the
budgets of the countries where they are installed, and the development
of new techniques of production and management. Foreign operations
also train and upgrade local labor and management and have a
significant impact on production, marketing, and labor practices of
local businessmen. 57 While stimulating further growth by reinvesting
profits, 5 multinational corporations also provide consumers with more
efficiently made and better serviced products.
In addition to these economic benefits, such private investment has
two advantages over public finance as a source of growth:
First it is free of political strings, often attached to government transactions.
Second it is equity capital and not debt, which must be amortized according to
fixed schedules in bad times and good, in periods of foreign exchange availability
or dearth.-"

The dominant pattern of manufacturing investment, however, has been
to provide import substitutes." Due to lack of demand and consequent
short production runs, the manufacture of completed goods abroad has
resulted in inefficient and high-cost production. For example,6
automobile companies in Latin America are producing small lots in
small plants at increased cost. Accordingly, a home-made vehicle
produced in Argentina at a cost of 4,000 dollars and in Brazil at a cost
of 3,000 dollars might have cost only 1,660 dollars if it had been made
in Detroit. Consequently, local production of completed consumer
goods not only results in inefficient use of the country's resources, but
also deprives the government of a source of tariff revenue.
Thus it has been suggested that multinational corporations should
begin allocating the manufacture of specialized components for use in
their global operations according to the comparative advantage of the
particular country.6 2 In other words, in many industries the
57. Improved labor relations can often be added to the list of benefits, especially where
United States based companies are concerned. This is hard to pin down precisely, but it is
significant that I.B.M.'s French workers did not participate in the general strike during the spring
of 1968. Rose, supra note 16, at 182.
58. In many instances, however, multinational corporations are unable to reinvest their
profits in less developed areas. Since investors expect to receive a return on their investment in
repatriated profits and dividends, eventually, the counterflow of profits and dividends can exceed
the current flow of investment to the underdeveloped area. Vernon, supra note 20, at 248.
59. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 29.
60. For a discussion of the import substitution policy, see id. at 35-39.
61. The example cited is taken from J. BARANSON, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 44-45 (1968). See also Baranson, Will There
An Auto Industry in
A

the LDC~s Future, 3 CoLUNS.

J. WORLD Bus. 49

(May-June 1968).

62. For a discussion of the principle of "complementation," i.e., he allocation of tasks

I
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multinational enterprise is uniquely able to link developing countries to
a world wide system of component production. Without the
multinational firm the developing countries are unlikely to undertake
the production of components in which they may have a comparative
advantage.
D.

The Future of the MultinationalCorporation

For the immediate future, the foreign movement of United States
companies appears to be slowing and changing directions.6 3 Although
total United States investment will continue to rise through 1970, the
annual increase in international investment has been declining steadily
since 19654 and will continue to do so. 5 United States companies are
planning to reduce their rate of investment in Canada and the Common
Market countries in the years ahead and at the same time increase
mining and oil outlays in developing countries.66
These changes are a reflection of the underlying economic
conditions. Overcapacity has begun to appear in Europe, while
expansion of domestic markets in the United States is making
7
If the United
investment at home as profitable as that in EuropeY.
States companies are pausing, European multinational corporations
seem to be doing the opposite, although similar projections are not
available. The movement of plant and investment from Europe and
especially Japan seems to be gathering momentum."
Although in most instances minority interests in foreign countries
are unable to cause legal trouble, the present trend has been toward 100
percent ownership of foreign subsidiaries.69 Since there is the chance
that a disgruntled minority partner will have enough local influence to
according to the comparative advantage of the country, see J. BARANSON, AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 63-65 (1968); THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra
note 4, at 40-41.
63. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 27-28; The Rush to Europe Slows
to a Crawl, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 3, 1968, at 82 [hereinafter cited as Rush to Europe].
64. Rush to Europe.supra note 63, at 82-84.
65. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 27.
66. Rush to Europe, supra note 63, at 82-84. Although it is estimated that United States
investment in Canada and the Common Market amounted to $4A billion in 1967, plans show a
reduction to some $3.5 billion for 1970 for these two regions. In the aggregate, however, United
States corporate investment abroad will have risen from $8.7 billion in 1967 to some $10.3 billion
by 1970 as a result of an increased flow of investment to the less developed nations. Id. at 82.
67. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 28; Rush to Europe, supra note

63, at 82.
68.

Rolfe, supra note 52, at 17.

69. Special Report, supra note 1, at 84; cf W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-24 (1964); Vernon, supra note 56, at 374 n.19.
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cause trouble for the major partner, the simplest way for a
multinational corporation to control all its parts-thus to
maintain the greatest flexibility-is plainly for it to own its empire 100
percent. But in parts of the world where countries have begun to assert
their claims to legal, political and economic control, a shift from
majority-foreign control to minority participation is beginning to take
place. 70 These nations are persuading companies to include local
partners in operations already set up, particularly in new ventures.7
Although a strong minority interest, coupled with technological knowhow and managerial skill, can still insure effective control, this shift
transfer of weight and control from
signifies on the whole an increasing
72
country.
host
the
to
the parent
It has been noted, however, that as international corporations
begin to rely on locally produced components, "share participation in
local subsidiaries no longer appears feasible. . . . [A]s manufacturing
industries shift to a more inter-dependent pattern . . . they must

control the product from component manufacture through assembly
and final marketing. ' ' 73 Accordingly, if the multinational corporation
is going to maintain a totally integrated operation and, at the same
time, meet the demands for local participation, this participation will
have to take the form of shareholding in the multinational enterprise.7 4
While multinational companies will undoubtedly continue to reach
out for greater expansion in those countries where they operate and to
move into new territories, it is by no means certain that they will evolve
into institutions that are truly international in spirit. Indeed, at present
it appears that few companies have gone very far toward achieving
international integration of management. Most multinational firms
70.

FRIEDMANN, supra note 69, at 24. See Special Report, supra note 1, at 84.

71. "In some countries such as India and Japan, local partnership is mandatory for almost
all industries." Special Report, supra note 1, at 84. Professor Friedmann contends that the last
stage in the gradual transfer of ownership from the foreign to the home country is "the complete

expropriation, or in extreme cases confiscation, of the foreign interests." He points out that this
trend is "illustrated by such major international events as the Iranian nationalisations of British

oil properties, the Argentinian nationalisations of British-owned railways, the Egyptian
nationalisation of the predominantly French- and British-owned Suez Canal, or the Indonesian

nationalisations of Dutch tobacco interests." FRIEDMANN, supra note 69, at 24.
72.

FRIEDMANN, supra note 69, at 24. There are two potential advantages in a multinational

corporation holding only minority interest in foreign subsidiaries. On the one hand, "li]t helps
avoid the stigma sometimes associated with being a 'foreign company,"' while, on the other, it

is "good business insurance to share ownership with a number of small local investors whose
return from their investment will seep through the local economy." Special Report, supra note

1,at 84.
73. THE INTERNATIONAL
74.

CORPORATION,

supra note 4, at 42.

See notes 82-83 infra and accompanying text.
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employ local citizens, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in -the lower
rungs of management in their foreign subsidiaries, 7- but when it comes

7
to the top jobs in the subsidiaries, the picture is mixed. 1
There are several reasons for the failure to create a truly
international managerial structure. First, there are relatively few

qualified executives, especially in many underdeveloped countries, and
the competition for those available is tremendous. 77- Second, since

men's lives are rooted in national customs, habits, and values which
they have accepted from childhood, executives are frequently unwilling

to transfer across national boundaries." Finally, companies fail to
adequately prepare the local executive manager for the hard climb up
the corporate ladder.79 Running a subsidiary may not be good training

for top corporate responsibilities. If the tend toward greater
centralization of control continues, 8 the top men in the subsidiary will

be less managers than national representatives of the corporation, and
thus may not be adequately prepared to take on the responsibilities of
a corporate-headquarters position.

Like management, it is uncertain whether the capital base of
multinational corporations will become truly international. Capital has

its own nationality. Under present conditions, it is unlikely that
shareholders in a multinational company in one nation would accept a
national of another as the chief executive officer and caretaker of their

investments. Likewise, politicians, statesmen, and government civil
servants would probably object to a foreigner holding billions of dollars
worth of local industrial power."1 The heads of some large
multinational companies have, however, suggested that eventually the
75. FRIEDMANN, supra note 69, at 29; Rose, supra note 16, at 180.
76. A survey of 150 United States industrial corporations revealed that although "20.7
percent of all their employees were foreign, only 1.6 percent of their corporate executives were
non-Americans." Rose, supra note 16, at 180. A number of executives contend, however, that
they no longer have a rigid policy that key people in units abroad must be American. For
example, the vice-president of Proctor & Gamble stated that they "never appoint a man simply
because of his nationality. A Canadian runs [their] French company, a Dutchman runs the
Belgian company, and a Briton runs [their] Italian company. In West Germany, an American is
in charge; in Mexico, a Canadian." Special Report, supra note 1, at 76. See Rose, supra note
16, at 180, 182. One observer feels that the Procter & Gamble experience represents a discernible

trend.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,

supra note 4, at 76.

77. See Rose, supra note 16, at 180.
78. Thackray, Not So Multinational,After All, INTERPLAY, Nov. 1968, at 23.
79. See Rose, supra note 16, at 180, 182.
80. For a discussion of the movement toward centralized control of international
operations, see Rose, supra note 16, at 104. But see THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra
note 4, at 66-72.
8 1. Thackray, supra note 78, at 23.
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stock of the parent should be widely held in nations where the company
has subsidiary operations." Local ownership of shares in the foreign
parent company makes
for widespread financial participation in international corporate affairs, without
raising the problems of multi-direction which participation through joint ventures
or subsidiary share-issue might, and move the international companies further
away from uninational status. Most large international corporations, and
particularly those with a high degree of interdependence among their component
parts, have urged share buying in the parent as the most efficient method of
financial participation in their activities.3

It is apparent that the movement toward internationalization will
continue, especially in the developing countries. Corporations will move
into new areas as opportunities are discovered that will reduce costs
and increase profits.
The benefits derived from international production suggest that the
movement abroad should be encouraged. As populations increase and
national resources become more limited, the multinational corporation
will play a significant part in not only maintaining but increasing the
standard of living for all persons. Even at the present time many
nations are no longer self-sufficient, and the multinational concern
provides a means of linking these nations with the more economically
developed areas of the world.
Encouragement should be tendered the internationalization of the
corporation as well as the internationalization of production. The goal
should be a truly international operation both from the standpoint of
management and ownership. In the former instance the burden lies with
the corporations. A continuous effort must be made not only to
adequately train but also to promote executives of all nationalities,
especially in the countries in which the corporation is located.

II.

THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE NATION STATE

The development of the multinational corporation raises doubt as
82. Special Report, supra note 1, at 86. Since the multinational company is already an
international resource in interests and ambitions, in investments, in employees, and in customers,
there is no reason why its benefits should not flow to owners as well as to workers and customers
without regard to individual nationalities.
83. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 114-15. Although it has been
suggested that the multinational corporation might get a friendlier reception around the world if
it "denationalized" itsownership, the opposite reaction might, in fact, result. If the multinational
enterprise sold its shares on national exchanges, "it would stand to be accused-perhaps
fairly-of fostering . . . [capital] flows from the less rich to the very rich." In addition, since
"the impression has gotten around that the subsidiary is a superefficient branch of a
superpowerful international system, its shares might sell at a premium and the corporation could
be accused of harvesting a windfall." Rose, supra note 16, at 182.
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to whether the nation-state is any longer the optimum political organization for the regulation of restraints on competition. The multinational
firm's tremendous resources, as well as its widespread contacts and
activities, not only make it difficult for nations to develop truly effective
competition policies but also enable the enterprise to challenge the
sovereignty of the nation-state. Since it often plays an. important role
in the economic growth of the nations in which it operates, the multinational company can have a significant impact on the nature and extent
of local governmental control. Attempts to regulate the multinational
enterprise by means of the extraterritorial application of national
competition policies have not only proved ineffective but have resulted
in increased international tension and conflict.
A.

The Validity of National Competition Policies

Although the affiliate of a'multinational firm may control only a
relatively small portion of the domestic market, national competition
policies must take into consideration the fact that the affiliate is part
of a much larger international operation and thus may have distinct
advantages over domestic companies. For example, a multinational
firm with a wide geographical diversification may employ massive price
cuts in one country in order to eliminate domestic competitors and thus
assure itself of a monopoly position.8 4 Although there is nothing
unusual about this technique, the structure of the multinational concern
permits it to absorb, without serious effect, losses which might prove
fatal for domestic companies'. Similarly, since the subsidiary of a
multinational firm has access to the world's financial resources at the
lowest possible cost, it has a distinct advantage over local firms in the
competition to purchase other domestic operations.
Accordingly, when affiliates of one or more multinational
companies are located within a nation's boundaries, the government
cannot realistically establish its competition policy on the premise that
the subsidiary is an independent entity unable to rely on the vast
resources of its parent.s1 Thus, before a nation will be able to develop
a truly effective system of regulation, it must take into consideration
the impact of the entire international operation on competition within
its own boundaries.
84.

Uri, MultinationalCompanies and EuropeanIntegration, INTERPLAY, Nov. 1968, at 21.

85.

This fact is particularly true in the case of many foreign nations where the problem of

size and monopolization has not prevailed and present policies are based on the premise that the

government is dealing with relatively small firms, none of which by itself is able to exercise a
disproportionate influence on the market. See note 161 infra and accompanying text.
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Since the competition policies of nations may differ both in
approach and extent of application, the multinational corporation may
be faced with a dilemma. If the foreign subsidiary conforms to the
interdictions to which the home office is subject, it does not behave like
a domestic company of the host country: it places a foreign sovereignty
above that of the country in which it is installed. If, on the other hand,
it follows the rule of the host country, it risks circumventing the
interdictions of the home government."0 Since the corporation will in
most instances adopt the policies of the parent government, a realistic
competition policy must reflect an awareness that policies in other
nations will have an effect on the activities of the affiliate in the host
country. Conversely, a nation must also consider the impact of its
actions on the activities of the multinational firm in other nations. By
adopting a specific approach to the regulation of restraints on
competition or by taking certain affirmative action, a nation will affect
the way in which the multinational firm carries on its activities in other
nations. Since the enterprise may be closely linked to the economy of
the foreign countries in which it operates, 7 such action may have an
adverse economic effect on other countries and thus conflict with the
nation's foreign policy objectives.8s
Given these considerations, and present conditions, it is doubtful
that a nation can develop an effective national competition policy. At
present, nations are often unable to determine either the impact of
foreign competition policies on domestic activities or the effect of
national action on foreign economies. Although there has been some
multinational communication on an informal basis, 9 there is no formal
means by which a nation-state can obtain such information.
Accordingly, a forum should be established in which it would be
possible for nations to consider the varying competitive policies, the
reasons for their adoption, and the extraterritorial effects of their
application.
86.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,

supra note 4, at 78-81; Uri, supra note 84, at 19-

20.
87. See notes 93-94 infra and accompanying text.
88. See generally note 118 infra.
89. See note 199 infra and accompanying text.
90. Such a forum would encourage multinational cooperation and thus better enable
governments to obtain the relevant industrial facts essential to the development and application
of their competition policies. At present, nations are frequently unable to obtain such information
because of the multinational character of the enterprise's operation. In addition, in order to make
a government's task more difficult, a corporation can adopt defensive measures such as shifting
the location of directors, records, and main offices in foreign lands. Timberg, International
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B.

The Effectiveness of NationalRegulation

Assuming that the nation-state could develop an appropriate
competition policy, it is doubtful that it would be able to effectively
apply it to the anti-competitive activities of the multinational firm.
Since multinational firms usually have well-established bases in more

than one country, they are not only able to transfer resources into a
country and out again, but also are able to use their knowledge of
existing national competition policies to choose to operate in those

countries which will apply favorable legal doctrines to the activities in
which they plan to engage.9 The relative ease with which the enterprise
is able to make and implement such choices, impervious to all but the

of the local economy, negates the effectiveness
most overt commands
92
of national control.
This flexibility takes on added significance when it becomes
apparent that many of these enterprises are closely linked with the

economies of their host countries.93 In many instances the multinational
company may be a large employer of national labor and consumer of

national materials and may account for a significant percentage of the
country's exports. In addition, these firms often carry on many
activities in the host countries which would be regarded in the United

States as governmental.94
Since not only the economies but the futures of many countries rely

heavily on the presence of the multinational enterprise, nations, for
practical reasons, may be unwilling to regulate restraints on competi-

tion. Governments may be hesitant to enforce existing regulations or to
take affirmative action to prohibit harmful business practices. Similarly,
the enterprise is able to use its tremendous financial and technological
resources to obtain concessions or at least the assurance that it will be
able to carry on its activities free of governmental restrictions. For
Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 575, 592 (1947). This strategy has become
extremely effective since countries have begun to enact measures prohibiting the furnishing of
information to foreign officials. See note 119 infra and accompanying text.
91. Timberg, supra note 90, at 590-91.
92. Vernon, Conflict and Resolution Between Foreign Direct Investors and Less Developed
Countries, in XVI I PUBLIC POLICY 333, 336-37 (J. Montgomery &A. Hirshman eds. 1968).
93. See Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 2 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.
25, 27 (Nov.-Dec. 1967); Timberg, supra note 90, at 581; Vernon, Foreign-Owned Enterprise in
the Developing Countries, supra note 56, at 375.
94. For example, at the time the United Fruit Company agreed to divest itself of its
Panamanian subsidiary, the subsidiary not only accounted for more than half of the value of the
total exports of the country, but also carried on innumerable governmental activities. United
68,941 (E.D.La. 1958); Folsom, Toward a
States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 CCH Trade Cas.
Rule of Reason in The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD 149, 164-65 (1967).
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example, the multinational corporation may threaten to move its
operation to a more cooperative country or merely to reroute its subsidiary's purchases through another country. It may also threaten to use
its financial network to pull money out of a country in balance-of-payments trouble or to move money into one struggling to damp down inflation."
It has been argued that the fears of host governments are
unjustified because "corporate executives are genuinely apolitical in
their pursuit of business affairs. They are concerned with reasonable
profits and not power.""6 Such an argument, however, is not relevant
to the underlying issue, and nation-states will continue to "sense that
the locus of their power is challenged by an open international system
in general and by multinational enterprises in particular.""7 The
concern of the latter for profits will cause them to seek the most
favorable legal climate in which to operate, and they will use their
resources, consciously or unconsciously, to influence local governmental action.
It is clear, then, that the nation-state is no longer able to cope with
the multinational corporation which "has, to a large extent, wrested
the substance of sovereignty from the so-called sovereign state." 8 If the
states are going to be able to meet the challenge of the multinational
corporation and, at the same time, maintain their identities, they must
coordinate their efforts. Only by acting collectively can nations
eliminate the effect of the enterprise's ability to shift its operations into
a country and out again. Such cooperation could be extremely effective,
especially in those instances where, because of the nature of its operation, a corporation can only operate effectively in a limited number
of countries.
C.

The Multinational Corporation As A Source of International
Tension and Conflict

Since it provides individual governments with an instrument
through which they can affect activities in foreign nations, the
multinational corporation has also been a source of increased
international tension and conflict. While the home government may use
its control over the parent company to influence activity in the host
country, the host government may provide direct or indirect incentives
95.
96.
97.

98.

See Rose, supra note 16, at 182.

note 4, at 125.
Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Oct. 1968, at 122.
Timberg, supra note 90, at 578.
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra

1969]

MULTINATIONAL

CORPORA TIONS

to influence activity which may not only adversely affect the economy
of the home government but may also violate its regulations concerning

restraints on competition.
Although these conflicts are most often given publicity when court
proceedings are involved, there are many situations that arise which
may not be publicized at all but which nevertheless give rise to frictions

and other difficulties.99 Indeed, in most instances the impact of
governmental policies on foreign branches and subsidiaries is indirect

and not always readily apparent. Instructions or guidelines issued by
government officials to a head office or subsidiary are normally passed

on in the ordinary course of internal multinational corporation
coordination. Through its control of the parent company, the home
government can influence the company's activity in other countries,

and thereby interfere with the host government's traditional right to
regulate competition within its national boundaries."' From the

standpoint of the latter, "there is a challenge to its sovereignty by the
home government through the multinational enterprise, which is legally

under the jurisdiction of both governments." '
There are no apparent international legal limitations which affect
a parent government's determination concerning its appropriate role in

indirectly commanding company behavior. With regard to the direct
extraterritorial application of national competition policies, it appears

that a state may exercise jurisdiction in its own territory over acts
which have taken place abroad. The Lotus"'2 is the leading case in
international law that stands for the proposition that "States may...

extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts
to persons, property and acts outside their territory ....
,13 Indeed,
99. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 78.
100. Behrman, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Interests and National
Sovereignty, 4 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 15 (March-April 1969).
101. Id. Professor Jack Behrman contends, however, that "[a] nation does not lose
sovereignty ... if it can exercise the ultimate power of destroying the particular entity which
presents the challenge." He feels that this "[u]Iltimate power resided in the governments" and
continues "to reside there today." Id. at 15-16. There is, of course, no doubt that theoretically
each nation has the power to destroy, alter, or control any affiliate of a multinational corporation
within its boundaries. However, as noted, if the economy of the country is dependent upon the
presence of the affiliate, practically speaking the government may not have the opportunity to
take such action.
/
102. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
103. Id. at 19; see J. WILLIAMS, CHAPTERS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 209 (1929); Brierly, The "Lotus" Case, 44 L.Q. REv. 154 (1928); 37 YALE
L.J. 484 (1928). In this case there was a collision, on the high seas, betwen
French and a
Turkish vessel, causing the loss of the latter and the death of eight Turkish nationals. When the
French ship arrived at Constantinople, its officer in charge of the watch was tried and convicted
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international law leaves a state "a wide measure of discretion which is
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules. .. ."104 Otherwise,
to adopt the principles which it regards as
"every State remains free
105
best and most suitable."
The only generally recognized "prohibitive rule" of international
law which applies in this case is that a state may not exercise its power
on the territory of another state. 6 This territorial principle is based on
the duty of all countries to respect one another's sovereignty. As such,
this limitation prohibits the enforcement of the acts of a state, such as
judgments, administrative decisions, and statutory orders or
prohibitions, in foreign countries.'"' Such acts can become effective
only with the consent of the foreign sovereign. There is, however, no
obligation that an act be recognized by the foreign state; this
determination is governed solely by the law of the recognizing state.0 8
Even though "courts and authorities must not carry out any
confiscation or search or any other official act in another country,"
there is no objection to obtaining facts in foreign countries "without
the exercise of sovereign powers."'0 9 As long as there is no threat of
legal action, officials may be sent abroad to collect voluntary
information, to inspect any records voluntarily made available to them,
or to carry out other investigations." 0
of involuntary manslaughter. The French and Turkish governments agreed to submit to the
Permanent Court of International Justice the question whether Turkey had acted in conflict with
the principles of international law in prosecuting the French officer. The Court decided in favor
of Turkey on the ground that the crime had been committed in Turkish territory (the Turkish
vessel) notwithstanding the fact that the French officer had at all times remained on board the
French vessel.
104. [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 9, at 19.
105. Id.
106. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824); 2 MOORE, A DIcEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1906); Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of
the Aititrust Law, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Schwartz, Applicability of National Law on
Restraints of Competition to International Restraints of Competition, in II CARTEL AND
MONOPOLY IN MODERN LAW 701, 723 (1961).
107. Schwartz, supra note 106, at 724.
108. Id. at 724-25. It appears that this limitation will be applied to the extraterritorial
enforcement of antitrust decisions. In United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp.
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), final order entered, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), the court
is not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign for this court to
commented that "lilt
direct that steps be taken to remove the harmful effects on the trade of the United States."
However, "the effectiveness of the exercise of that power depends upon the recognition which will
be given to our judgment as a matter of comity by the courts of the foreign sovereign . ...
Id. at 229.
109. Schwartz, supra note 106, at 706.
110. As will be noted, however, some countries have enacted measures which prohibit the
submission of documents to foreign officials where antitrust proceedings are involved. See note
119 infra and accompanying text.
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There is only one United States case that has applied national
antitrust laws to agreements made by foreigners in foreign countries.
In United States v. Aluminum Company of America,"' Judge Learned
Hand held that the agreements," 2 notwithstanding their completely
foreign nature, were unlawful because "they were intended to affect
imports and did affect them."' 1 3 He also noted that "any state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends."" 4 It is important to note, however, that
this application of the objective territorial principle' 5 has been
criticized from the point of view of international law,"' and other
countries have been reluctant to recognize the extraterritorial
application of American antitrust laws.'18
There are also practical limitations on the exercise of the authority
of the parent government over the affairs of the multinational
corporation arising out of conflicts with foreign economic objectives." 7
I11.
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In this case the court had to decide whether a cartel
agreement between a British company, two German companies, a Swiss and a Canadian company
made in Switzerland and lawful under Swiss law, was in violation of § I of the Sherman Act
because of its effect on the aluminum imports into the United States.
112. The agreements referred to were: first, an agreement made in Paris in 1931 to which
all parties were foreign companies and which did not take imports into the United States into
account in fixing productign and distribution quotas; second, a 1936 agreement, also made abroad
between the same parties, which provided for the payment of royalties in respect to production
exceeding free quotas. There was no reference in the 1936 agreement to imports into the United
States, and the district court found that only the Canadian company counted shipments to that
country as part of its production quota. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp.
97, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Judge Hand held, however, that the general restriction on production
outside the United States, at which the 1936 agreement was directed, evidenced a clear intent to
affect imports into the United States and that the burden was on the defendants to prove that
there was no such effect. As they failed to sustain this burden, the agreement of 1936 was found
to violate § I of the Sherman Act.
113. 148 F.2dat444.
114. Id. at 443.
115. The objective territorial principle holds that an offense is committed also in a place
where the effect of the unlawful act has materialized.
116. Professor Haight contends that "[i]t is . . . clear from the opinions in The Lotus that
an objective application of the territorial principle is only permissible when not only is the
consummation of 'effect' inseparable from the act committed abroad but the offense is one which
the community of civilized nations has come to regard as justifying a modification of the strict
territorial principle. In the case of antitrust violations, there are several features which distinguish
such offenses from those so regarded by the community of civilized nations." Haight, supra note
106, at 644. See also Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust
Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954).
117. Behrman, supranote 100, at 17-18.
118. See Linowitz, Antitrust Laws: A Damper on American Foreign Trade? 44 A.B.A.J.
853 (1958). Contra, Fugate, Damper or Bellows? Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade, 45 A.B.A.J.
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Since situations do exist in which the exercise of power produces results
which are contrary to other objectives of the government, the
government will refrain from the exercise of its power when the
potential costs are high or the gains are uncertain. For example, the
pursuit of antitrust objectives, without modification or amelioration for
overall foreign policy purposes, may well prevent the achievement of
other, high-priority foreign goals.
The host government might also move to reduce the level of
foreign intferference by imposing penalties on the parent government,
directly or indirectly, economically or politically. Host governments
have the means of imposing such counter-restrictions since they have
a unit of the multinational concern within their boundaries. For
example, the response to the extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws has been both clear and critical. Legislation
prohibiting compliance with foreign antitrust measures has now been
enacted in Demark, Finland, India, Holland, Norway, Panama,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the provinces of
Ontario and Quebec."' Like the parent government, however, the host
government will impose countervailing restrictions only when it can do
so withput endangering other objectives which are equally or more
20
important.
The host government may also encourage or pressure the affiliate
2
a
of multinational corporation into carrying on specific activity. '
Governments now offer various incentives in order to shape industrial
policy. Enterprises that behave in an agreeable way in foreign countries
often find that they have greater assurances of licenses, better access
to credit, readier promises of tax exemptions, and better likelihood of
government purchases than do recalcitrant fellow enterprises. 22 The
critical question in this instance is how much coercion or pressure must
947 (1959). See also Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations with Foreign Nations, 1959
ANTITRUST LAW SYmPOsIum: HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE CLAYTON ACT 51; Note, The Role of

the American Corporation in the Economic Development of Latin America: A Study of the
Conflict Between the Extra-territorialApplication of United States Antitrust Laws and United
States Foreign Policy. 19 VAND. L. REv. 757 (1966).

119. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 4, at 81. Such legislation prohibits
compliance with foreign antitrust measures either generally or merely in relation to the submitting
of documents.
120. Behrman, supra note 100, at 18.

121. Vernon, supra note 5, at 84-85. It is not uncommon for the host government to make
an unofficial request of the parent company to control the behavior of a subsidiary in a given
way. Behrman, supra note 100, at 20-21.

122. This is especially true since successful international agreements are now more likely
to include governments either as sponsors or as direct parties. Vernon, supra note 5, at 84.
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a host government exert before the parent government will agree that
a multinational enterprise has acquired immunity from charges of
acting in violation of the parent government's competition policy.1 2 In
the United States, it appears that no real problem would exist for the
multinational enterprise if the foreign government unambiguously
directed a subsidiary to pursue a course that appeared to violate United
States competition Policy. 24 As long as there was no conspiracy
between the enterprise and the government leading to the issuance of
that direction,'25 the enterprise could behave as directed without fear of
legal action by the United States. Problems arise, however, as the host
government's activity becomes more ambiguous. "Now that
governments are so actively in the business of purposeful intervention,
the more ambiguous situations are likely to arise with considerable
' 'I2
frequency. 1
It is apparent that as long as the interests of the government and
the parent of the multinational firm diverge, or as long as governments
can induce affiliates to act against the wishes of the host government,
interference by governments through the multinational corporation in
the affairs of other national sovereignties is likely to continue.
There is no evidence that governments will act unilaterally to remove
their own contribution to the conflict, and it is unrealistic to expect them
voluntarily to accept a limitation on the exercise of their power. Consequently, it is mandatory that some formal means of international
communication be established so that nations can discuss and coordinate their various approaches to the regulation of restraints on competition. The existence of such a forum would not only encourage the
joint resolution of existing problems and make more effective the
application of national regulations, but, more importantly, it would tend
to reduce the tension which presently exists among nations.

III.

NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES

Although some cooperation and even concentration of resources,
both in production and trade, is obviously inevitable in modern
123. Id. at 85.
124. See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 93 (1958); 1955 REP.
OF THE ATr'Y GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM.TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 83.
125. A conspiracy to restrain American commerce which was successful in obtaining
favorable foreign legislation was condemned in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268

(1927).
126.

Vernon, supra note 5, at 85.
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industrial conditions, 127 it is generally acknowledged that "no society,

however organized, can do without competition.' 28 It is also generally
conceded that there are certain restrictive business practices that are
almost universally regarded as reprehensible while, at the other

extreme, certain practices are, even in the "purist" systems, condoned
or approved as necessary to the maintenance of a competitive economy.
Despite this agreement and the fact that many countries of the free
world believe that a competitive free enterprise society is the most

satisfactory social pattern,'29 nations approach the task of regulating
restraints on competition in different ways.1 31 In order to fully
comprehend the differences which must be reconciled, a brief discussion
of the various national approaches to regulation and the reasons for
131
their adoption is necessary.

A.

Various Approaches to the Regulation of Restraints on
Competition

In the United States and Canada, regulation of competition is
premised on the basic assumption that the competitive mechanism is
the best means of assuring economic growth, and there is, in theory,
an abso*lute prohibition against all restraints on competitiori. Other
127. "Cooperation and concentration may . . . be demanded by technological needs, by
minimum efficiency of standardized production, by the need to keep prices to a reasonable level,"
Friedmann, A Comparative Analysis, in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE SYMPosIuM, 3 U.
OF TORONTO COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES, at 521 (W. Friedmann ed. 1956).
128. Id. -[T]he way in which Soviet Russia has encouraged competition between its
different public enterprises shows that a socialist society cannot evade this problem any more than
a capitalist society." Id.
129.
130.

ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION, 70, 81 (1963-64).
See generally ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE. SYMPoSIUM. 3 U. OF TORONTO

COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES (W. Friedmann ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as ANTI-TRUST LAWS];
C. EDWARDS, TRADE REGULATIONS OVERSEAS, THE NATIONAL LAWS (1966); MONOPOLY AND

COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION (E.H. Chamberlin ed. 1954); ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS

PRACTICES (1954) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO LEGISLATION]; Bennett, Comparison of United
States and Foreign Antitrust Laws, 3 INT'L & ComIP. L. BULL. 14 (1958); Carlston, Antitrust
Policy Abroad (pts. 1,2) 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 569, 713 (1954); Timberg, European and American
Antitrust Laws-A Comparison, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 131 (1962); Timberg, Restrictive Business
Practices. Comparative Legislation and the Problems that Lie Ahead, 2 AM. J. CoiP. L. 445
(1953). An extensive survey of the literature on the subject of United States and foreign antitrust
laws governing international business transactions appears in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 673-92 (W.Surrey & C. Shaw eds. 1963).
131. It should be noted that it is extremely difficult to categorize the various national
competition policies, and generalizations often result in partial inaccuracies. Where national
legislation does exist in this field, it differs in broadness of legal scope, detail of administrative
articulation, extent of economic activity covered, intensiveness of enforcement, and animating
public policy objectives.
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nations, however, have adopted a regulatory approach and examine on
an ad hoc basis all combinations and restraints on competition in order
to determine whether they may be beneficial or fulfill a constructive
function. At the other extreme are the less developed countries that
have no express policy concerning competition and have adopted what
may be termed a laissez faire approach.
1. Prohibitory Approach.-Since the basic assumption in the
United States and Canada has been that the dynamism of business
progress and economic growth springs from a free and expanding
market,1 2 these nations have adopted the approach of "prohibiting
comprehensively andA in principle all forms of restrictive actions and
agreements tending to eliminate competition.' ' 33 Accordingly, practices
restricting competition are "considered illegal as such, or at least are
seriously suspect. 1' 34 Although these countries acknowledge that in
certain situations violent competition might be crippling, 13 5 the
prevailing belief is that industrial progress and economic development
is best assured by tapping the competitive instincts of the individual
businessman. Industry collaboration and restrictive practices, on the
other hand, are thought to supply a protective haven for technological,
production, and market laggards, who would otherwise be reformed
into efficiency or eliminated by the purging process of competition.131
Accordingly, the United States relies on competition and free
market structure to prevent arbitrary and unreasonable prices,
limitations on production, and industrial stagnation and inefficiency.
"Productivity, the fair treatment of consumers and the equitable and
full utilization of resources are assumed to be best achieved, not by
government dirigism (sic) and the continuing official supervision of
industry, but by the competitive energies of businessmen."'' 37 The
132. See ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 70, 81 (1963-64); Bennett,
supra note 130; Carlston, supra note 130, at 734; Timberg (United States), in ANTI-TRUST LAWS,
supra note 130, at 403.
133. Friedmann, supra note 127, at 525.
134. Bennett, supra note 130, at 14.
135. Despite their belief in the unqualified good of competition, these countries recognize
that there are certain restrictive practices that are necessary for the maintenance of an effective
competitive economy. Accordingly, in order to "provide a satisfactory compromise between the
demand for a healthy competitive economy, and the recognition of the need for certain forms of
cooperation and restriction on competition in an industrial and business society that is subjected
to constantly changing challenges and pressures," the United States and Canada have developed
what, in practice, is generally referred to as "workable competition" or effective competition.
Friedmann, supra note 127, at 532.
136. Carlston, supra note 130, at 734.
137. Timberg (United States), in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, supra note 130, at 424.
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government's role, therefore, is that of an occasional intervenor to
liberate business from ill-advised private restraints on competition.
After the Second World War, the prohibitory approach was
exported to Japan and Germany.1 3 Although the United States's

influence in Japan is virtually at an end, 3 ' United States competition
policy did play an important part in the formulation of the new
140
German Cartel Law.

The main reasons for the enactment of an express competition

policy in the United States and Canada were the existence of
unreasonable market power and unfair practices. 4' In these nations,
laws were originally framed in fear of and in reaction to "big"
business.' The policy has since developed, however, into one designed

to preserve competition.4 3 United States competition policy is aimed

in part at protecting small business from large business. 44 This
preference for the small enterprise at the expense of large business and
more efficiency can be indulged in because of the success of large firms
45
in the United States.
American competition policy also recognizes that all contending

economic and political factions are not equally articulate and wellrepresented. 4 This recognition has tempered the original laissez faire
138. Friedmann, supra note 127, at 525.
139. This is indicated by the fact that the Antitrust Law of 1947 has been effectively
paralyzed by increasing numbers of exemptions and lack of public support. See generally Ariga
& Rieke, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39 WASH. L. REV. 437 (1964);
Osakadani (Japan), in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, supra note 130, at 238; Yamamura, The Development
of Anti-Monopoly Policy in Japan: The Erosion of Japanese Anti-Monopoly Policy, 1947-1967,
2 J. L. & ECON. DEVELOP. 1 (1967).
140. See generally Shapiro, The German Law Against Restraints on Competition-Comparative and International Aspects (pts. 1,2) 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 201
(1962); Schwartz, Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany-A Comparative Study, 105 U.
PA. L. REv.617 (1957).
141. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
xiii (1965). For a general discussion of the origins of United States antitrust policy, see D. DEWEY,
MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW

139-57 (1959).

142. See Bennett, supra note 130, at 20-21; Timberg, European and American Antitrust
Laws-A Comparison,7 ANTITRUST BULL. 131, 135-36 (1962).
143. The tendency to regard the Sherman Act as an instrument to maintain competition
was first indicated in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Corp., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
144. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1966); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341-42 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); KAYSEN &
TURNER, supra note 141, at 16-17.
145. Americans already enjoy the benefits of the large firm and do not have to promote it.
Bennett, supra note 130, at 2 1.
146. Timberg, Industrial Organization and Regulation in the Netherlands and United
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attitude towards business and conditioned legal attitudes towards
restrictive practices. Having regard for the unprotected position of
consumers or others who must deal with business groups, the law

allows less room for business activity which might tend to restrain
competition.

Finally, United States competition policy stems in part from a
pessimistic view of human nature. Americans do not trust the
individual's capacity or desire to use economic power wisely for the
general good. As a result, there is a much greater reliance on the
impersonal, automatic operation of the free competitive market

mechanism. 14 7 "Competition in this context is desirable because it
substitutes an impersonal market control for the personal control of

powerful business executives, or for the personal control of government
bureaucrats."148
2. Regulatory Approach.-Many nations that have enacted
measures to regulate restraints on competition also believe that
competition may be ruinous and wasteful 4 and that excessive

economic freedom may be harmful to national prosperity."' Since these
countries feel that "cooperation may 'rationalize' competition by

making it more efficient,"''

5

there is "a stronger preference for

12
freedom of contract and [a] lesser belief in the value of competition."

States: Some Comparative Reflections, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 525, 533 (1958); Timberg (United
States), in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, supra note 130, at 407.
147. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 141, at 14-16; Timberg Industrial Organization
and Regulation In the Netherlands and United States: Some Comparative Reflections, 106 U.
PA. L. REv. 525, 531-32 (1958). "This reliance has not in any fundamental way been shaken by
the economists' demonstration that the market mechanism is not as impersonal and automatic
as we had thought, and is inapplicable to certain large industrial areas." Id. at 532.
148. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 141, at 14. In the United States "[alntitrust, like
corporation law and patents, is based on the principle of the minimal governmental interference
with economic affairs that is necessary to preserve the economic liberty of the individual. In fact,
it proceeds on the premise that business firms possessing illegal monopoly power, or the power
to fix prices, are illict 'private governments.' If such powers are needful in the public interest,
they cannot be confided to the interested parties but must be entrusted to government as the
objective arbiter of the public good." Timberg (United States), in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, supra note
130, at 405-406.
149. ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 70, 81 (1963-64); Bennett,
supra note 130, at 14; Verloren van Themaat (Netherlands), in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, supra note
130, at 264.
150. For a general discussion of the social, economic, political, and legal environment in
which such attitudes toward competition developed, see Thorelli, European Antitrust Policy, 8
U. CHI. L.S. REc. 1 (1959).
151. Bennett, supra note 130, at 14.
152. ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 70, 81 (1963-64). The
difference between national competition policies depends largely on the balance (or lack thereof)
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Accordingly, these nations have adopted the general attitude that
restrictive agreements, cartels, or even monopolies are not inherently
bad, 153 "but . . . are suspect, and subject to inquiry and possible
prohibition.' 154 These countries condone restrictive practices which

promote the public welfare through industrial efficiency, and a
restriction will be considered bad only if it is "abusive."'," A practice
is "abusive" when it "is actually detrimental to the public by
promoting excessive prices or undue underproduction, limits on
technology or exclusion of competitors.'

151

Restrictions which have no

effect or do not adversely affect the public interest are normally not
considered unlawful.

In France, for example, where a greater emphasis is put on
economic effect, the government encourages those restrictive practices

that result in price reductions, technical progress, and higher
productivity and eliminates those that do not. 57 Likewise, in the
Netherlands, the government retains the power to encourage industrial

combinations and restrictive agreements where they are favorable and
to repress them where they are contrary to the public interest.

5

Since in most nations which have adopted the "abuse approach"
the validity of combines and restrictive practices usually depends upon

their purpose and effect in light of the general economic policy, a
which individual countries have drawn between the two following principles: (I) freedom of trade
and competition and (2) freedom of contract and association. In France and Sweden, for example,
the general principle of freedom of contract has been given preference over the principle of free
trade. Bolin (Sweden), in ANTI-TRUST LAws, supra note 130, at 321; Castel (France), in ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 130, at 91-92. For a general discussion of these two principles and their
relation to national competition policies, see Timberg, Restrictive Business Practices,
Comparative Legislation and the Problems That Lie Ahead, 2 Am.J. Comp. L. 445-51 (1953).
153. Although all the European antitrust laws deal primarily with cartel arrangements,
there is an increasingly widespread interest in the regulation of specific restrictive practices,
whether engaged in by cartels or by single firms. Thorelli, Antitrust in Europe: National Policies
After 1945, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 222 (1959). In France, for example, there are flat prohibitions
of conduct applicable to certain kinds of tying arrangements, discrimination, and refusal to sell,
and to rixation of minimum prices upon goods not specifically exempted. C. EDWARDS (France),
supra note 130, at 20-32.
154. Friedmann, supra note 127, at 527.
155. ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 70, 81 (1963-64); Bennett,
supra note 130, at 14; see, e.g., IV GUIDE TO LEGISLATION (Netherlands), supra note 130, § 0,
at 6-7; Bolin (Sweden), in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, supra note 130, at 323; Castel (France), in ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 130, at 93-94.
156. Bennett, supra note 130, at 14.

157. Castel (France), in

ANTI-TRUST LAWS,

supra note 130, at 93-94; C.

EDWARDS

(France), supra note 130, at 37.
158. IV GUIDE TO LEGISLATION (Netherlands), supra note 130, § 0, at 3-4; Verloren van

Themaat (Netherlands), in ANTI-TRUST

LAWS,supra note

130, at 271-72.
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neutral attitude exists with regard to competitive restraints. 159

Accordingly, the government relies upon a case-by-case inquiry into the
purposes of the combination or restrictive practice and its possible
impact on the market. In most instances all the good and bad aspects
of the combination, agreement or practice are evaluated, and a
determination is made -as to which aggregate outweighs the other. If
on balance the added gain to commerce outweighs the loss caused by
a restriction of competition, and if the loss was necessary to permit the

gain, it is likely that the restriction- will be upheld for lack of public
60

injury.1
Since outside the United States and Canada, size and
monopolization, as such, have not been serious threats to competition,
most foreign competition policies implicitly assume relatively
small firms with relatively equal bargaining power.16 1 Consequently,
those policies have been developed primarily to prevent restrictive

business practices which are abusive or contrary to public policy. In
these nations it is not felt that competition is the only means of
assuring industrial development and economic growth; competition is
preserved only upon a determination that it will be in the best interest

of the public.
Many of the nations which -have adopted the regulatory approach
also believe that an informed public opinion causes interested industry
groups to relax their selfish pressures. 6 2 Consequently, many of these
nations have adopted comprehensive laws which provide for the public

registration of certain restrictive business practices.

63

These laws

159. Bennett, supra note 130, at 14; see IV GUIDE TO LEGISLATION (Netherlands), supra
note 130, § 9, at 1; Bolin (Sweden), in ANTI-TRUST LAW, supra note 130, at 319; Castel (France),
in ANTI-TRUST Law, supra note 130, at 91.
160. Bennett, supra note 130, at 17. In the United Kingdom, however, although broadly
speaking no restrictive practice is condemned outright (collective resale price maintenance is an
exception), there is a presumption in the case of certain restrictive trade practices that the
practices concerned are contrary to the public interest. The burden of proof is, therefore, placed
on the parties concerned to satisfy the government to the contrary. IIIGUIDE TO LEGISLATION
(United Kingdom), supra note 130, § 0, at 7-9. See also Grunfeld & Yamey (United Kingdom), in
ANTI-TRUST LAWS, supra note 130, at 340.
161. Bennett, supra note 130, at 17-20. Indeed, since in most of these countries there are
large numbers of relatively small firms, a general feeling has grown up that increased size will
increase efficiency and therefore only the abuses of size must be curbed. Timberg, supra note 142,
at 135-36.
162. Timberg, supra note 147, at 531-34.
163. See generally Friedmann, supra note 127, at 548-49; Thorelli, supra note 153, at 22728; Timberg, supra note 152, at 457-59. Professor Friedmann notes that although "the publicity
principle constitutes, to a large degree, the answer to the legality principle on the part of those
countries which believe that restrictive practices and cartel agreements are not inherently bad, but
should be exposed to the light of publicity," these nations "are not content with registration
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generally require commercial enterprises and trade associations to
report restrictive agreements and other practices as defined by statute
and to file data relating to the agreements or understandings. The laws
are premised on the notion that publicity is a powerful preventive of
harmful restrictive practices in that it not only supplies the government
with information enabling it to remedy abusive practices but also
subjects undesirable business practices to the strong sanction of an
adverse public opinion.'64
3.

Laissez Faire Approach.-The competition policy adopted by

the majority of countries that have no specific legislation concerning
competition has been characterized 'as a "do nothing"'' 5 or laissez faire
approach. The absence of an express statute in a foreign country is an
indication of the national attitude with regard to economic activity in
the sense that the public policy of such a country does not oppose
restrictive business practices.
Such an approach usually results from a simple reliance upon the
fundamental principles of freedom of contract and association and
from a belief that combinations and restrictive practices are valid since
they are the outcome of free trade, free contract, and free association.
In some instances, however, this policy has also developed from a
fatalistic belief that although restraints on competition are usually
undesirable, it is impossible to stem such developments. I Accordingly,
these countries rely on their courts to invalidate or condemn a
particular transaction or practice that happens to come before it.
Transactions that are contrary to boni mores or public policy may be
nullified, while other transactions, such as fraud or blackmail, are
7
considered crimes.16
It is extremely difficult to determine the competition policy of a
foreign nation that adopts this attitude. Although the government has
made no formal pronouncement of its public policy regarding
competition by statute or decree, it is possible that the government may
alone. In different ways, they provide for adjudication by an independent tribunal." Friedmann,
supra note 127, at 548-49.
164. For a general discussion of the weaknesses of registration, see G. SrOcK]Na, & M.
WATKINS, CARTELS OR CoMPETrroTN? 427 (1948); Timberg, supra note 152, at 459-60.
165. Friedmann, supra note 127, at 522. The nearest approach to the "do nothing attitude"
was, until recently, the position adopted by the English. Id.; A. HUNTER, COMPETITION AND THE
LAW 15 (1966).
166. Friedmann, supra note 127, at 522.
167. Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study of the Antitrust
Consequences of the Principle Forms of Investment by American Corporationsin Foreign
Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 400,451 n.279 (1962).
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attempt to act as a catalyst in the development .process and either
directly or indirectly encourage activity that restricts free
competition."6 8 Thus, a government may require cooperation or a
combination of independent business interests or may give legal
protection to the means utilized or enforce restrictive arrangements by

the provisions of their Contract, patent, or trademark laws.
B. Reasons for the Different Approaches
There are two primary reasons for the existence of different
approaches to the regulation of restraints on competition. First, there

are among nations varying degrees of reliance upon the competitive
process as a means for achieving economic efficiency and progress. 6 ,

While some countries believe that competition is the best means for
assuring economic development,

other nations believe that

concentration of economic power or restraints on competition may be
necessary to achieve this end. Second, depending upon the

circumstances of its national economy, a particular country may
choose to emphasize the attainment of one goal over another.17 0 For
example, a debate of world-wide significance presently exists over the

relationship between individual freedom and economic efficiency. While
highly industrialized nations have indicated a willingness to sacrifice

economic progress for individual freedom, other less-developed nations
seem convinced that the problems of subsistence come first.
IV.

PREVIOUS

ATTEMPTS AT INTERNATIONAL

REGULATION OF

RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES

There have been several unsuccessful attempts to regulate
restrictive business practices on an international level.171 Although past

efforts have been primarily concerned with the harmonization of
168. Id.; Vernon, supra note 5, at 84-85.
169. "The outstanding economic goal with bears on competitive policy is the desire to
promote the growth of the economy and to raise standards of living." M. MASSEL, COMPETITION
AND MONOPOLY, LEGAL AND EcONOMIC IssuEs

22 (1962).

170. Although the primafy objectives of competition policies are economic, social and
political 'goals also affect competition policy. Some of the more important social and political
aims are the assurance of personal freedom and equality of opportunity, the maintenance of a
standard of business conduct that is considered fair, the avoidance of concentrated economic
power, and the limitation of economic concentration and governmental interference. See generally
A. HUNTER, supra note 165, at 17-21; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 141, at 11-22; M.
MASSEL, supra note 169, at 15-41.
171. See Gunther, The Problems Involved in Regulating InternationalRestraints of
Competition by Means.of Public InternationalLaw, in II CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN
LAw 579 (1961).
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national cartel laws, an examination of these attempts will point up the
key problems that must be resolved before international regulation will
become feasible and will demonstrate why a more moderate approach,
such as the coordination of national competition policies, may be the
only realistic solution to the problem at the present time.
The problem of international regulation of restraints on
competition was considered as early as 1927. At that time a committee
of the World Economic Conference held under the auspices of the
League of Nations considered reports recommending the
harmonization of national cartel laws and the adoption of an
international convention for this purpose, together with measures
designed to establish international control over cartels. Although the
Conference decided that the League of Nations should cooperate with
governments and publish studies on matters of general interest, no
positive action resulted since it was concluded that "the adoption of
international rules of law would be impracticable owing to differences
in national cartel policies."''
In 1946 the United States, through the Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization,' 73 sponsored an international
agreement looking to the prevention and control of restrictive business
practices in international trade. The Charter was never adopted,
however, largely because the United States Government 'announced in
7
1950 that it could not secure its ratification by Congress. 1
In 1951 the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
passed a resolution establishing an ad hoc committee to prepare
proposals for implementing the principles set out in the Havana
Charter. 75 This effort to develop a means for regulating cartels at the
international level was also abandoned because of a general
disagreement over the approach adopted and a feeling that it would be
impossible to reach agreement on whether certain restrictive practices
had a harmful effect on competition.
172. Id. at 581-82.
173. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment held in Havana, Cuba, from
November 21, 1947, to March 24, 1948. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, March 24, 1948. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PuB. No. 3117, COMMNERCIAL POLICY
SERIES 113.
---174. Gunther, supra note 17!, at 586.
175. Ad Hoc Comm. on Restrictive Business Practices, Report, 16 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp.
221, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/2380 (1953) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Report]. See generally Carlston,
supra note 130, at 723-33; Domke, The United Nations Draft Convention on Restrictive Business
Practices,4 INT'L& CoMp. L.Q. 129 (1955); Gunther, supra note 171, at 586-89.
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Proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business
Practices

While the attempt of the Havana Charter was part of a
comprehensive approach to free international trade of governmental
policies and other burdens, the proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee
(Agreement) were limited to the single problem of restrictive business
practices. Both instruments, however, contemplated the establishment
of agreed rules for the conduct of business organizations in the sphere
of international trade and means for the application of such rules to
the entire business community of the member nations or parties to the
Agreement. 7 '
The primary aim of the Agreement was "the attainment of...
higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic
and social progress and development.' ' 77 In order to achieve this goal
it recognized the need "[t]o promote the reduction of barriers to trade,
. . . to promote on equitable terms access to markets, products, and
productive facilities" and "[t]o encourage economic development...
particularly in under-developed areas."'' 7 A further objective was the
promotion of "mutual understanding and cooperation in the solution
' 79
of problems arising in the field of international trade.' 1
The activities of the proposed organization (OrgAnization) would
have been directed toward the prevention of business praetices adversely
affecting international trade."' According to the Agreement, it was not
sufficient for these practices merely to "restrain competition, limit
access to markets, or foster monopolistic control," but it was required
that they "have harmful effects on the expansion of production or
trade, in light of the objectives set forth in the Preamble . . . ,""' The
fact that the practice was engaged in by a public as distinguished from
a private commercial enterprise did not affect the jurisdiction of the
Organization,"' but the Agreement did not apply if "the practice in
176. Since the Havana Charter and the proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive
Business Practices have essentially the same purpose and follow the same format, the following

discussion will be confined to an examination of the latter.
177.
178.
179.

Preamble, U.N. Report, supra note 175, at 12.
Id.
Id. The purpose of listing these objectives was to provide an over-all criterion for

dealing with each case. Any government lodging a complaint could determine for itself which
objectives were to be considered as relevant, and any objective not so cited need not be considered
by the Organization. Gunther, supra note 171, at 587.
180. Art. 1, T 1, U.N. Report, supra note 175, at 12-13.
181. Art. 1,
1, U.N. Report, supra note 175, at 13 (emphasis added). A series of
restrictive practices is defined in art. 1,
3, U.N. Report, supra note 175, at 13.
182. Id.art. 3,
1.
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question [had] been specifically required by governmental measures
""
existing prior to the complaint .
Each member agreed to "take all possible measures by legislation
or otherwise, in accordance with its constitution or system of law and
economic organization" to insure that commercial enterprises did not
engage in any of the specified practices and to "assist the Organization
in preventing these practices."' 4 The obligation of a member to carry
out decisions of the Organization was limited, however, to taking the
action it considered appropriate in the particular case "having regard
to its. obligations under tdais Agreement."" The Agreement further
provided that the member 'was not required to take action other than
that which would be "in accordance with its constitution or system of
law and economic organization."' 86
The Agreement provided for consultation and investigation of
written complaints 8 and authorized the Organization to conduct
studies and to publish the results either on its own initiative or at the
request of any member. 8 Decisions on the issues presented by
complaints were made by the Organization itself acting by majority
vote and not by a separate judicial body. 8 '
If the Organization found that a particular business practice had a
harmful effect in light of the purpose of the Agreement, the scope of
its remedial power was confined to the making of a "request" to "each
Member concerned to take every possible remedial action.""' The
Organization could also recommend to the members concerned
remedial measures to be carried out in accordance with their respective
laws and procedures. If the government failed to act, it was required
to "inform the Organization of the reasons therefor and discuss the
matter further with the Organization if it so requests."' 9
Since the Agreement refrained from suggesting any punitive
measures, the Organization's powers were limited to publication of
reports, recommendations for remedial action, and the publication of
183.
184.

Id. art. 3,
Id. art. 5,

4..
Iat 14.

185.

Id. art. 5,

4, at 14.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. art 3, at 13-14.
1, at 14.
Id. art. 4,
3, at 15. The Agreement has been criticized for creating a procedure of
Id. art. 10,

an essentially litigious character without an adequately defined body of law to be applied, without
a judicial organ to apply such body of law and with only a most nebulous authority for
enforcement of the decisions reached. Carlston, supra note 130, at 730.
190. Art. 3, % 8, U.N. Report, supra note 175, at 14.
5, at 14.
191. Id. art. 5,
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its conclusions. The investigation procedure provided for publication of
detailed reports "showing fully the decisions reached, the reasons
therefor and any measures recommended to the Members
concerned.'11

2

B.

Effectiveness of the Proposals

It is apparent that the Agreement created a system of obligations
to prevent restrictive business practices which were binding upon
member nations only to the extent that each member permitted them
to be. Thus, the system had no real substance except as any one
member might have so organized. its constitution or system of law and
economic organization that a decision of the Organization would
become an obligation binding it to performance. Those nations which
have developed a strong system of internal law controlling restrictive
business practices would have a duty to carry out their obligations
under the Agreement, while a nation which lacks such a system of law
might plead that very lack las an excuse fori not carrying out the
decisions of the Organization." 3
It is apparent, then, that the effectiveness of the Agreement relied
upon the publicity which is necessarily involved in any activity of an
international agency. The authors of the Agreement expected that such
publicity would have a far-reaching and lasting effect on elimination
of restrictive business practices. It was thought that the publicity given
complaints and subsequent recommendations would cause governments
and interested business circles to give more thought to the prevention
of such practices.
C.

The Problem of Varying Competition Policies

The main problem which must be faced in developing a system of
international control is the wide variety of national approaches to
restraints on competition and the resulting diversity of governmental
attitudes with respect to the same restrictive business practices. Thus,
for example, "one or two governments might make mandatory a
practice which other governments might prohibit, ignore, approve of,
or subject to different degrees of regulation or sponsorship. Also,
governments have different principles and procedures governing the
way in which they require or approve restrictive business practices."' 94
192. Id. art. 3,
193.
194.

8-10.
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Since it was generally believed that agreement on effective legal
standards for determining harmful restrictive practices was impossible,
the Ad Hoe Committee on Restrictive Business Practices adopted the
approach of requiring remedial action only upon a showing that the
restrictive business practices had a harmful effect upon trade.
Accordingly, there was no presumption in the Agreement that the
various restrictive practices listed in it were harmful per se, and the
Organization would have to make a case-by-case evaluation to
determine whether the specific practice had "harmful effects on the
expansion of production or trade, in-light of the objectives set forth in
the Preamble" of the Agreement.' 95 The effectiveness of the regulations
in providing a solution would, therefore, have depended entirely on the
inclinations of the various member countries.
The failure to implement the Agreement was in large part due to
this approach since many of the countries involved felt that with the
large difference in national competition policies it would have been
virtually impossible for the Organization to determine in a concrete
case whether a given restrictive practice was harmful to international
trade.
As a result of the failures to adopt either the Havana Charter or
the Proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee, it has been generally
concluded that the control of international restraints on competition
will depend for its success on the criteria for such restraints being
standardized and binding in international law.19 If this is not done, the
only valid criterion for judging international restraints on competition
is their harmful effect on international trade.
It is clear that agreement on effective legal standards appears
impossible in the near future. However, as a result of the emergence
of the multinational corporation, it is no longer feasible to await the
development of similar multinational competition policies in order to
achieve such agreement. An alternative or intermediate solution must
be found.
V.

AN

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE COORDINATION

OF

NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES

Some individuals have suggested that the activities of
multinational corporations can be regulated only by a supranational
organization.'1 7 Since nations are hesitant to relinquish national
195.
196.
197.

Art. 1,
1, U.N. Report, supra note 175, at 13.
Gunther, supra note 171, at 586-89.
Ball, supra note 93.
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sovereignty and since there is a wide variety of viewpoints with regard
to the regulation of competition, it is likely that such an approach is
unrealistic at the present time.
At the other extreme, many American businessmen have suggested
that the application of antitrust laws be limited by national
boundaries.9 8 The wisdom of such an approach is doubtful, however,
in light of the increase in international investment. Since the regulation
of a multinational firm may affect the trade of other nations, a nation
by adopting such an approach would simply be throwing away the
right to protect itself from public as well as private foreign
arrangements that it thought harmful to its national interests.
A more realistic approach is the use of prior consultation and
coordinated action among sovereigns on issues that affect more than
one of them. This approach is, to some extent, already being applied
by the United States. For instance, the United States now makes it a
practice to conduct consultations with Canada and with a number of
other countries before instituting antitrust action that affects their
interests."' Likewise, the Council of Ministers of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development has recommended that
member states consult one another on matters concerning restrictive
practices .20
As international business grows and spreads, national economies
will become more interdependent and the problems of competition and
monopoly will cross international boundaries with increasing
frequency. Accordingly, "[a]n agreement among governments to hold
informal consultations for every case as it arises . . . [will be] clearly
inadequate. If tension is to be kept within tolerable limits, a more
explicit form of coordination will be needed.12 0 1 Thus, it is
recommended that an organization be established to sponsor
negotiations, settle disputes, and provide a forum for the continuous
investigation and analysis of restrictive practices in which it would be
possible to set forth fully the economic philosophies and legal
assumptions that are prevalent in all countries. The primary aim
should be to promote the growth of the world economy and to raise
standards of living throughout the world by promoting mutual
198.

Vernon, supra note 5, at 86.

199.

Id. For an example of recent consultations between the United States and the British
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understanding and co-operation in the solution of problems arising in
the field of international trade.
The organization should not only provide a forum for
consultations, but should require member states, prior to taking any
action with regard to the regulation of competition that would affect
international trade, to notify those nations which would be affected by
such action and, if the affected nations so desire, to consult with them.
By requiring prior consultation, the organization would force a nation
to consider not only the effect of its proposed action on foreign
countries, but also the conflicting antitrust laws and economic policies
of those nations. Such a determination can only be made by
communicating with the other members of the world community.
Whenever possible an attempt should be made to obtain a
mutually satisfactory solution by means of negotiation. In order to
achieve this end more effectively, business representatives should be
included as participants in the negotiations. Since corporations may be
willing to alter their activities to meet national demands, this may
make it easier to obtain a mutually satisfactory solution. Perhaps more
importantly, by permitting business to participate in the decision
making process, the organization will demonstrate its acceptance of
business as a responsible partner in the international community and
thereby encourage it to cooperate and voluntarily refrain from
agreements and activities detrimental to the public good. As
populations increase and national resources become more limited,
multinational corporations will play an even more significant part in
maintaining and increasing the standard of living for all persons. Thus,
it is only reasonable that nations should urge their cooperation and
seek their advice in attempting to develop an integrated world
economy.
By providing a means for consultations, the organization would
also tend to reduce the use of the multinational corporation as a means
for interfering in the activities of other nations. It would provide
countries with an opportunity to accomplish diplomatically what they
have heretofore attempted to achieve through private channels. It
would also provide a public forum to which nations could direct
complaints concerning such private interference. Thus, nations would
be forced to weigh carefully the advantages of indirect interference
against the cost of subjecting themselves to the sanction of an adverse
public opinion.
Increased cooperation would also make the application of national
competition policies more effective. Through mutual cooperation,
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nations would not only have greater access to essential industrial facts,
but would also have greater assurance that their decisions would be
enforced. Such an organization would hopefully reverse the trend
toward national legislation which prohibits the compliance with foreign
antitrust legislation.
Finally, such an international mechanism would betterenable the
less developed countries of the world to meet the challenge of the
multinational corporation. By acting collectively, these nations would
be able to limit the effect of the multinational enterprise's, ability to
shift the location of its operations and thus reduce the influence of the
enterprise on any one country. The less developed countries must come
to realize*that the most rapid way to increase their rate of economic
development is to become part of a fully integrated international
productive scheme. They must be more willing to take advantage of the
benefits that flow from the multinational corporation. By putting these
countries in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis the multinational
firm they will have, less reason to fear the loss of their sovereignty and,
therefore, will be more willing to judge benefits that flow from the
multinational concern in terms of a purely cost-benefit analysis. The
development of such a forum would also help reduce the tendency of
these nations to expropriate or confiscate affiliates of multinational
corporations in an attempt to develop a self-sufficient national
economy.
G. PHILIP NOWAK

